ObliviOS Developer portal Project site

Home / Threat model / Abuse cases

Abuse cases

The ways a privileged path could be abused, the control each one requires and the test evidence for it.

1Privileged-path abuse cases

  1. 29

    A bug in Arti, the packet layer or a parser of the exit daemon gives an attacker its privileges

    Required control
    The daemon is Rust, in its own domain, with CAP_NET_ADMIN only and no routing-table, netfilter or other Binder right, so it cannot change routing for the device (the rules come from the separate route helper, next row); the TLS provider contains C code (D-L of the network exit design); a whole-branch review and fuzzing of the DNS and IP parsers come before an image.
    Test evidence
    Not tested yet.
  2. 30

    The exit app, or a process that reaches the route helper, redirects or blackholes the traffic of the device

    Required control
    The helper has NETLINK_ROUTE rights only, no internet socket and no Tor; its code accepts a closed set of rule shapes inside the band 13100 to 13999 and table 4747, uid ranges of at least 10000 and the one fixed tun address (169.254.42.127/24, RouteSpec takes an interface name and no address), and nothing else; only the exit app may connect (SELinux context); a compromised exit app can steer app uids into the tun or away from it, which is its function, and cannot touch system uids, other tables or a route outside the band (ADR-186).
    Test evidence
    NET-008, MSK-008 (mechanism); the property test of the specification in the host checks; not run on an image.
  3. 31

    A flow is assigned to the circuits of another app (the owner lookup fails or races)

    Required control
    The daemon refuses a flow it cannot attribute to a uid and uses no shared key; DNS queries and other flows use the same lookup; the owner of a plain DNS query is the app ([measured], ADR-184); DNS-over-TLS and the resolver cache that two apps share are open.
    Test evidence
    NET-006 (distinct exit addresses per uid); DNS-over-TLS not tested.
  4. 32

    A host forces the speed guard to show the device's address to it (ADR-188)

    Required control
    The guard passes a company on to an app after 4 MiB from that company to that app within a minute, so a host that sends 4 MiB to an app unmasks itself for that app. This is accepted: the guard is a usability protection for content hosts that no list names, not an anonymity claim. The effect is one company and one app, 30 minutes, memory only; it is visible (a notification and a Settings list, each with "Hide again", which keeps the company hidden for that app until the daemon restarts) and equals the user's own "Show my address". The counters are keyed by the uid that owns the flow (from sock_diag), so no traffic of one app promotes a company for another; the tables are bounded (4096 pairs and pins) and hold counts and company ids only. A video that runs longer than the hold goes through Tor for 4 MiB again when the hold ends (known).
    Test evidence
    MSK-011; the host checks and the mutations of guard.rs, scaffolding.rs and server.rs.
  5. 33

    The daemon's own traffic is routed into its tun, or shows the use of Tor to a network operator without consent

    Required control
    The daemon's uid is outside every preference and it sets no socket mark; it starts only after the user confirmed (ADR-181, section 5).
    Test evidence
    NET-001b not run.
  6. 34

    The decoy session or another user sees the owner's destinations or retention setting

    Required control
    Separate store and file per user; no user-id argument; the decoy has an empty store.
    Test evidence
    MAP-003
  7. 35

    The history becomes forensic evidence of app use

    Required control
    Memory only by default; history is opt-in with a user-chosen duration, stored encrypted per user, expiring, clearable and outside backup.
    Test evidence
    MAP-004, MAP-005, MAP-006
  8. 36

    Collecting slows or breaks name resolution or connections

    Required control
    Non-blocking O(1) callback, exceptions swallowed, drop on overload, callback removable.
    Test evidence
    MAP-007, MAP-008
  9. 37

    A hostile app floods lookups to evict other apps' entries or to inject text into the interface

    Required control
    Per-uid and global caps with same-uid eviction; hostname validation; hostnames rendered as plain text only.
    Test evidence
    MAP-009
  10. 39

    The collector or the app is reused as telemetry or an export channel

    Required control
    The app declares no network permission; no export API; denial list in the capability rows; code review item.
    Test evidence
    MAP-011, MAP-013
  11. 40

    The package list the app holds is used to fingerprint the owner

    Required control
    QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES is held for icons and labels only, the app cannot send anything off the phone, and it keeps no file.
    Test evidence
    MAP-013, MAP-015
  12. 41

    A map shows a place that reads as the owner's own or as where data went

    Required control
    The owner's location is never read; a company base is labelled a base, with the words "not where its servers are"; a server place (ADR-161) is drawn apart with a hollow marker and worded "hosted in", never as a company's country or as where data went; services with no known place are listed, not placed.
    Test evidence
    MAP-012, MAP-016, MAP-033
  13. 42

    The address data is wrong or altered and the map shows a false server place

    Required control
    The file ships in the signed system image and is pinned by SHA-256; a city is drawn when the city data and the country data name the same country, or the country data names none, and a country alone only from the country data; an anycast prefix or a DNS-steered network gets no place (the operator names are matched as whole words, ADR-164 (3)), and a disagreement says "location uncertain"; the interface says "hosted in" and names the operator.
    Test evidence
    MAP-033

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.