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Abuse cases

The ways a privileged path could be abused, the control each one requires and the test evidence for it.

1Privileged-path abuse cases

  1. 15

    Bonded-device-scoped identity patch regresses to a device-wide spoof

    Required control
    The bonded-BD_ADDR scoping condition is itself part of the reviewed patch and its own test case; any change to the scoping condition requires the same security-case review as the original patch.
    Test evidence
    AIR-021.
  2. 16

    Compromised exit daemon changes routing

    Required control
    The daemon has no nlmsg_write on a NETLINK_ROUTE socket and no netfilter socket; only the route helper writes rules, in a closed language (priority band, one table, uid ranges inside the app uids).
    Test evidence
    check-sepolicy.py and check-neverallows.sh on the built policy; the tests and mutations of routes/spec.rs; the close-out review.
  3. 17

    A process other than the exit app connects to a control socket of the exit service

    Required control
    SELinux allows connectto for exit_app only; both services read the peer's SELinux context before the first byte.
    Test evidence
    check-sepolicy.py; the stranger and wrong-uid tests; NET-009 (not run).
  4. 18

    A malformed control frame, DNS message, packet or mask list attacks a privileged parser of the exit service

    Required control
    Length-first bounded decoders in Rust and Java, unsafe in two reviewed modules, fuzz tests, a panic-site audit, and golden frames shared by both codecs.
    Test evidence
    src/fuzz.rs, PANIC-SITES.tsv, tests/vectors.txt, the mutation runs of the daemon and the exit app.
  5. 19

    An app set to Tor leaves through another network, or Direct before the Tor network exists (F01, F11)

    Required control
    The guard rules of the route helper allow it only the unmarked case and the Tor network; the network preference is set before the daemon is contacted, so the app has no network until the Tor network exists.
    Test evidence
    NET-008 (kernel mechanism), the boot-order host checks, NET-011 (not run).
  6. 20

    The Tor client contacts the Tor network before the user asked

    Required control
    The daemon creates the client unbootstrapped and starts it with the first Tor or masked class; the consent starts unset and the masked tier is empty until it is on.
    Test evidence
    The tests of wait_until_needed; MSK-005 and NET-009 (not run).
  7. 21

    The scoped non-SDK API exemption or identity patch is reused by an unrelated feature to justify broader hidden-API or Bluetooth-stack access

    Required control
    The exemption and patch are named and scoped to the AirPods compatibility service alone in the platform tree; any other consumer requires its own separate security case.
    Test evidence
    AIR-022.
  8. 22

    A third-party app binds the AirPods device-settings provider, reads the header icons through the icon provider, or opens the AirPods pages

    Required control
    The provider service and the pages require android.permission.BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED, which the Settings app holds; the icon provider is not exported and grants read access to com.android.settings only, and serves a fixed allow-list of bundled images and never a caller-supplied path.
    Test evidence
    AIR-035.
  9. 23

    Device metadata is rewritten to point Settings at another service

    Required control
    Only AirPodsApp writes the AirPods metadata keys and the platform removes them on forget. The recommended write route is a narrow setter behind MANAGE_AIRPODS_IDENTITY (key allow-list, bonded and registered devices only), not BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED; the owner confirmed it and it is implemented, uncompiled (ADR-117, ADR-119).
    Test evidence
    AIR-034, AIR-036.
  10. 24

    The UI shows unformatted device data or a hard-coded string

    Required control
    Every user-visible string is an Android resource; values from the device are formatted through locale formatters and validated in airpods-core before display.
    Test evidence
    AIR-033.
  11. 25

    Real Apple Find My network participation is reintroduced via stored Apple credentials or emulated device attestation

    Required control
    Refused as a hard non-goal, not merely deprioritized; any future proposal requires an explicit, separate, owner-approved decision.
    Test evidence
    N/A — refused by design, no implementation exists to test.
  12. 26

    A third-party app reads the Data Map

    Required control
    READ_DATA_MAP is protection level signature plus privileged and allow-listed for DataMapApp only; its own SELinux domain restricts find of the service (system_app and traceur_app, which may find every other service type, are excluded from it); every method uses the calling user. The permission check alone does not separate the app from apps of the system uid, which hold every permission, so SELinux is the gate.
    Test evidence
    MAP-001, MAP-002
  13. 27

    The Data Map export gives the data to a place the user did not mean (ADR-189)

    Required control
    The export is one text file, written only after the user confirms a dialog that says it can be kept by the chosen place and any app that reads it, through the system document picker and the content URI it returns; the app holds no storage permission and no exported component other than its launcher, so no other app can start it or receive it; the file holds service keys (classifier suffix or registrable domain), counts and times, never a full host name, bytes or a server place. A picker destination that syncs to a cloud provider is the user's choice and is named in the dialog.
    Test evidence
    MAP-041
  14. 28

    A third-party app or another process talks to the exit daemon

    Required control
    The control sockets are created by init and accept only the exit app (the peer SELinux context is checked before the first byte is read, ADR-186) and typed, bounded messages; the daemon and the route helper serve no Binder service (ADR-184).
    Test evidence
    Not tested yet; the rows are added with the first build.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.