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Abuse cases
The ways a privileged path could be abused, the control each one requires and the test evidence for it.
1Privileged-path abuse cases
- 15
Bonded-device-scoped identity patch regresses to a device-wide spoof
- Required control
- The bonded-BD_ADDR scoping condition is itself part of the reviewed patch and its own test case; any change to the scoping condition requires the same security-case review as the original patch.
- Test evidence
- AIR-021.
- 16
Compromised exit daemon changes routing
- Required control
- The daemon has no
nlmsg_writeon aNETLINK_ROUTEsocket and no netfilter socket; only the route helper writes rules, in a closed language (priority band, one table, uid ranges inside the app uids). - Test evidence
check-sepolicy.pyandcheck-neverallows.shon the built policy; the tests and mutations ofroutes/spec.rs; the close-out review.
- 17
A process other than the exit app connects to a control socket of the exit service
- Required control
- SELinux allows
connecttoforexit_apponly; both services read the peer's SELinux context before the first byte. - Test evidence
check-sepolicy.py; the stranger and wrong-uid tests;NET-009(not run).
- 18
A malformed control frame, DNS message, packet or mask list attacks a privileged parser of the exit service
- Required control
- Length-first bounded decoders in Rust and Java,
unsafein two reviewed modules, fuzz tests, a panic-site audit, and golden frames shared by both codecs. - Test evidence
src/fuzz.rs,PANIC-SITES.tsv,tests/vectors.txt, the mutation runs of the daemon and the exit app.
- 19
An app set to Tor leaves through another network, or Direct before the Tor network exists (F01, F11)
- Required control
- The guard rules of the route helper allow it only the unmarked case and the Tor network; the network preference is set before the daemon is contacted, so the app has no network until the Tor network exists.
- Test evidence
NET-008(kernel mechanism), the boot-order host checks,NET-011(not run).
- 20
The Tor client contacts the Tor network before the user asked
- Required control
- The daemon creates the client unbootstrapped and starts it with the first Tor or masked class; the consent starts unset and the masked tier is empty until it is on.
- Test evidence
- The tests of
wait_until_needed;MSK-005andNET-009(not run).
- 21
The scoped non-SDK API exemption or identity patch is reused by an unrelated feature to justify broader hidden-API or Bluetooth-stack access
- Required control
- The exemption and patch are named and scoped to the AirPods compatibility service alone in the platform tree; any other consumer requires its own separate security case.
- Test evidence
- AIR-022.
- 22
A third-party app binds the AirPods device-settings provider, reads the header icons through the icon provider, or opens the AirPods pages
- Required control
- The provider service and the pages require
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED, which the Settings app holds; the icon provider is not exported and grants read access tocom.android.settingsonly, and serves a fixed allow-list of bundled images and never a caller-supplied path. - Test evidence
- AIR-035.
- 23
Device metadata is rewritten to point Settings at another service
- Required control
- Only
AirPodsAppwrites the AirPods metadata keys and the platform removes them on forget. The recommended write route is a narrow setter behindMANAGE_AIRPODS_IDENTITY(key allow-list, bonded and registered devices only), notBLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED; the owner confirmed it and it is implemented, uncompiled (ADR-117, ADR-119). - Test evidence
- AIR-034, AIR-036.
- 24
The UI shows unformatted device data or a hard-coded string
- Required control
- Every user-visible string is an Android resource; values from the device are formatted through locale formatters and validated in
airpods-corebefore display. - Test evidence
- AIR-033.
- 25
Real Apple Find My network participation is reintroduced via stored Apple credentials or emulated device attestation
- Required control
- Refused as a hard non-goal, not merely deprioritized; any future proposal requires an explicit, separate, owner-approved decision.
- Test evidence
- N/A — refused by design, no implementation exists to test.
- 26
A third-party app reads the Data Map
- Required control
READ_DATA_MAPis protection levelsignatureplusprivilegedand allow-listed forDataMapApponly; its own SELinux domain restrictsfindof the service (system_appandtraceur_app, which may find every other service type, are excluded from it); every method uses the calling user. The permission check alone does not separate the app from apps of the system uid, which hold every permission, so SELinux is the gate.- Test evidence
MAP-001,MAP-002
- 27
The Data Map export gives the data to a place the user did not mean (ADR-189)
- Required control
- The export is one text file, written only after the user confirms a dialog that says it can be kept by the chosen place and any app that reads it, through the system document picker and the content URI it returns; the app holds no storage permission and no exported component other than its launcher, so no other app can start it or receive it; the file holds service keys (classifier suffix or registrable domain), counts and times, never a full host name, bytes or a server place. A picker destination that syncs to a cloud provider is the user's choice and is named in the dialog.
- Test evidence
MAP-041
- 28
A third-party app or another process talks to the exit daemon
- Required control
- The control sockets are created by
initand accept only the exit app (the peer SELinux context is checked before the first byte is read, ADR-186) and typed, bounded messages; the daemon and the route helper serve no Binder service (ADR-184). - Test evidence
- Not tested yet; the rows are added with the first build.
Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.