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ObliviOS Threat Model

Who could attack ObliviOS, along which path, and what stops, detects and repairs it.

1Scope and objectives

This model covers ObliviOS-owned additions, its GrapheneOS-derived base, release operations, and supported Pixel devices. It does not claim to defeat a fully compromised hardware root of trust, unknown vulnerabilities, or network-level denial of service. Its objectives are confidentiality of user data and keys, integrity of boot/update/policy decisions, availability of essential phone functions, isolation between apps and Worlds, and accountable remediation.

2Assets

User data and decryption keys
Never exposed to an untrusted app, service, model, or operator.
Authentication secrets
Hardware-backed where supported and never exported by ObliviOS.
App and World isolation
No access across boundaries without an explicit Android/ObliviOS sharing path.
Network policy
Only typed, authorized policy operations mutate it; every mutation is auditable.
Signed update trust
Only ObliviOS-authorized verified artifacts install; downgrade attacks are rejected.
Recovery authority
Restores a trusted state without weakening verified boot or disclosing protected data.
AI broker authority
Limited to validated typed requests; an untrusted prompt gains no capability.

3Trust boundaries

The trust boundaries, from the top to the bottom Pixel hardware and hardware-backed keys leads to Verified boot. Verified boot leads to GrapheneOS-derived Android base. GrapheneOS-derived Android base leads to Untrusted Android applications. GrapheneOS-derived Android base leads to ObliviOS least-privilege services. ObliviOS least-privilege services leads to ObliviOS SystemUI and Settings. ObliviOS least-privilege services leads to Optional local AI broker. Source, build, and signing environment leads to Signed ObliviOS update metadata and artifacts. Signed ObliviOS update metadata and artifacts leads to GrapheneOS-derived Android base. Recovery environment leads to Verified boot. Pixel hardware andhardware-backed keys Source, build, and signingenvironment Recovery environment Verified boot Signed ObliviOS updatemetadata and artifacts GrapheneOS-derived Androidbase Untrusted Androidapplications ObliviOS least-privilegeservices ObliviOS SystemUI andSettings Optional local AI broker
The diagram of the threat model, drawn from its source in the document. It reads from the top to the bottom.

Applications, network content, update-hosting infrastructure, prompts, and build workers are untrusted by default. Production signing keys and hardware-backed verified-boot keys are high-trust assets.

4Security review rule

No privileged ObliviOS component enters implementation until its caller, permissions, data minimization, audit event, error behaviour, and test method appear in docs/security/capability-boundaries.md.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.