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Supply chain
The attacks on the supply chain, the path of each, the mitigation and detection it requires, and the recovery and validation evidence.
1Supply-chain abuse cases
The controls below are specified in docs/release/supply-chain-and-signing.md. They apply before a signed ObliviOS artifact exists and remain in force for every channel.
- 1
compromised source fetch
- Attack path
- A source origin, manifest, tag, prebuilt, or Pixel input is substituted before the build.
- Required mitigation and detection
- Locked manifest; primary-origin retrieval; tag/signature, commit, hash, origin, and terms verification; source-lockfile comparison.
- Recovery and validation evidence
- Quarantine input, rebuild from verified source, investigate provenance mismatch; reject mismatched-source test.
- 2
compromised build worker
- Attack path
- A worker alters source, tools, configuration, or unsigned output.
- Required mitigation and detection
- Ephemeral isolated worker; pinned host/tool image; no production key; immutable logs; independent reproducible build and hash comparison.
- Recovery and validation evidence
- Quarantine worker and credentials, rebuild independently; worker-isolation and reproducibility tests.
- 3
signing-key theft
- Attack path
- A channel key is copied, accessed without authorization, or used for an unapproved candidate.
- Required mitigation and detection
- Separate channel keys; stable offline storage; restricted ceremony access; recorded approvals; independent signature verification; rotation/revocation triggers.
- Recovery and validation evidence
- Contain and revoke suspect key, execute emergency replacement and transition; key-compromise rehearsal.
- 4
malicious OTA metadata
- Attack path
- An update host serves forged, stale, wrong-channel, wrong-device, expired, or hash-mismatched metadata.
- Required mitigation and detection
- Signed, versioned, expiry-bounded, hash-bound metadata with channel/device checks and audit events.
- Recovery and validation evidence
- Reject metadata, pause/withdraw rollout if necessary, publish advisory; signature, expiry, channel, device, and hash rejection tests.
- 5
rollback attempt
- Attack path
- An attacker attempts a downgrade or update that violates rollback-index policy.
- Required mitigation and detection
- Update preflight and platform rollback-index enforcement; no downgrade or index-bypass procedure.
- Recovery and validation evidence
- Reject the update and preserve audit evidence; rollback-rejection test on supported hardware.
- 6
recovery-image substitution
- Attack path
- A substitute or tampered factory/recovery image attempts to replace the trusted recovery route.
- Required mitigation and detection
- Separately signed device-compatible recovery/factory artifacts; artifact/hash verification; release-key validation; verified-boot-preserving relock flow.
- Recovery and validation evidence
- Reject image and use verified artifact; tampered-image, interrupted-recovery, factory-install, and relock tests.
Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.