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Supply chain

The attacks on the supply chain, the path of each, the mitigation and detection it requires, and the recovery and validation evidence.

1Supply-chain abuse cases

The controls below are specified in docs/release/supply-chain-and-signing.md. They apply before a signed ObliviOS artifact exists and remain in force for every channel.

  1. 1

    compromised source fetch

    Attack path
    A source origin, manifest, tag, prebuilt, or Pixel input is substituted before the build.
    Required mitigation and detection
    Locked manifest; primary-origin retrieval; tag/signature, commit, hash, origin, and terms verification; source-lockfile comparison.
    Recovery and validation evidence
    Quarantine input, rebuild from verified source, investigate provenance mismatch; reject mismatched-source test.
  2. 2

    compromised build worker

    Attack path
    A worker alters source, tools, configuration, or unsigned output.
    Required mitigation and detection
    Ephemeral isolated worker; pinned host/tool image; no production key; immutable logs; independent reproducible build and hash comparison.
    Recovery and validation evidence
    Quarantine worker and credentials, rebuild independently; worker-isolation and reproducibility tests.
  3. 3

    signing-key theft

    Attack path
    A channel key is copied, accessed without authorization, or used for an unapproved candidate.
    Required mitigation and detection
    Separate channel keys; stable offline storage; restricted ceremony access; recorded approvals; independent signature verification; rotation/revocation triggers.
    Recovery and validation evidence
    Contain and revoke suspect key, execute emergency replacement and transition; key-compromise rehearsal.
  4. 4

    malicious OTA metadata

    Attack path
    An update host serves forged, stale, wrong-channel, wrong-device, expired, or hash-mismatched metadata.
    Required mitigation and detection
    Signed, versioned, expiry-bounded, hash-bound metadata with channel/device checks and audit events.
    Recovery and validation evidence
    Reject metadata, pause/withdraw rollout if necessary, publish advisory; signature, expiry, channel, device, and hash rejection tests.
  5. 5

    rollback attempt

    Attack path
    An attacker attempts a downgrade or update that violates rollback-index policy.
    Required mitigation and detection
    Update preflight and platform rollback-index enforcement; no downgrade or index-bypass procedure.
    Recovery and validation evidence
    Reject the update and preserve audit evidence; rollback-rejection test on supported hardware.
  6. 6

    recovery-image substitution

    Attack path
    A substitute or tampered factory/recovery image attempts to replace the trusted recovery route.
    Required mitigation and detection
    Separately signed device-compatible recovery/factory artifacts; artifact/hash verification; release-key validation; verified-boot-preserving relock flow.
    Recovery and validation evidence
    Reject image and use verified artifact; tampered-image, interrupted-recovery, factory-install, and relock tests.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.