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ObliviOS Capability Boundaries

What each service may take in, give out and do, and what it is denied.

Each service has a narrow interface. Denied capabilities must later become platform permission, Binder, SELinux, storage, and test policy.

  1. 1

    Network policy

    Allowed inputs
    Authorized typed request.
    Allowed outputs
    Policy decision and connection summary.
    Data classification
    App identity/policy/network metadata.
    Privileges
    Assigned network-policy APIs.
    Explicit denials
    Packet-content inspection, arbitrary VPN config, cross-profile reads.
    Audit events
    Policy create/change/delete and denial.
    Failure behaviour
    Keep last valid policy; fail closed only for explicit block.
  2. 2

    Worlds/profile manager

    Allowed inputs
    User-mediated lifecycle or share request.
    Allowed outputs
    Profile state and explicit share token.
    Data classification
    Profile metadata; profile-bound data.
    Privileges
    Multi-user/profile APIs.
    Explicit denials
    Silent cross-world access, shared clipboard by default, credential reads.
    Audit events
    Create/switch/delete/share approval.
    Failure behaviour
    Abort incomplete change; preserve profiles.
  3. 3

    Secure Share

    Allowed inputs
    User source, destination, constraints.
    Allowed outputs
    Time-bounded share handle.
    Data classification
    Selected data and share metadata.
    Privileges
    Explicit URI/content grant path.
    Explicit denials
    Directory-wide grant, background export, hidden cross-world copy.
    Audit events
    Request, approval, expiry, revoke.
    Failure behaviour
    Revoke incomplete grant and delete temporary handle.
  4. 4

    Secure Clipboard

    Allowed inputs
    Explicit copy/paste and policy.
    Allowed outputs
    Profile-scoped expiring item.
    Data classification
    Clipboard content for configured retention.
    Privileges
    Clipboard-service extension.
    Explicit denials
    Cross-world read, silent history.
    Audit events
    Copy, paste, expiry, denial.
    Failure behaviour
    Clear expired or invalid item.
  5. 5

    Notification Firewall

    Allowed inputs
    Notification metadata and user policy.
    Allowed outputs
    Allow, suppress, summarize, quarantine.
    Data classification
    Metadata and content only with user policy.
    Privileges
    Notification filter scope.
    Explicit denials
    Default content export to AI, mutation outside policy.
    Audit events
    Decision, match, summary, override.
    Failure behaviour
    Deliver when unavailable unless user selects fail closed.
  6. 6

    Package installer

    Allowed inputs
    Signed install/update request and metadata.
    Allowed outputs
    Allow, deny, quarantine.
    Data classification
    Manifest, signature, scanner findings.
    Privileges
    Installer integration only.
    Explicit denials
    Signature bypass, integrity spoofing, silent privileged install.
    Audit events
    Scan, signature, policy, approval.
    Failure behaviour
    Reject invalid package; retain previous version.
  7. 7

    Updater

    Allowed inputs
    Signed channel metadata and artifact.
    Allowed outputs
    Verified staged update request.
    Data classification
    Release metadata and hashes.
    Privileges
    Updater integration/storage.
    Explicit denials
    GrapheneOS update URL, unsigned metadata, downgrade bypass, signing-key access.
    Audit events
    Check, download, signature, install, rollback.
    Failure behaviour
    Reject artifact; retain verified system.
  8. 8

    Backup

    Allowed inputs
    User-approved configuration and handles.
    Allowed outputs
    Encrypted artifact and restore manifest.
    Data classification
    Data encrypted before export.
    Privileges
    Scoped backup APIs and key references.
    Explicit denials
    Plaintext cloud upload, vault export, cross-world mixing.
    Audit events
    Create, verify, restore, delete.
    Failure behaviour
    Preserve original data; remove incomplete artifact.
  9. 9

    Vault

    Allowed inputs
    Explicit credential/passkey operation.
    Allowed outputs
    Authenticated credential result.
    Data classification
    Secrets and cryptographic references.
    Privileges
    Hardware-backed credential APIs.
    Explicit denials
    AI secret access, raw secret logging, plaintext backup.
    Audit events
    Request, user auth, key-use failure.
    Failure behaviour
    Deny and reveal no secret material.
  10. 10

    Passwords app

    Allowed inputs
    The user's passphrase and, if switched on, a fresh strong-biometric authentication; the fields of a login screen that the autofill framework hands over; the user's own entries and export files.
    Allowed outputs
    Pixels on the screen; a chip (a key icon and one line of text, ADR-191, proposed) in the strip of the system keyboard, drawn by the system from this content; fills into the field the user chose (a username and a password, after an authentication); the user's own encrypted export file; the single generic "login exists" answer of the domain index.
    Data classification
    Secrets (passwords, notes, history); keyed hashes of the registrable domains and packages that have an account.
    Privileges
    An app with the user's uid; Keystore keys for the hardware secret, the index and the biometric wrapper; the autofill service and credential provider service roles, once the user selects them; no platform privilege.
    Explicit denials
    INTERNET and every network and radio permission (a host check fails the build), backup of any kind, any exported component that returns a secret, bulk reads of the vault by other apps, the screen-lock credential as an unlock, a log line with a secret, a screenshot or recents image (every window is secure), saved instance state, fuzzy domain matching, fetching a logo, a chip for any keyboard other than the system keyboard, a chip that shows a password, a dataset filter taken from the stored value.
    Audit events
    None of its own (no account, no telemetry); failed unlocks are counted locally and only throttle.
    Failure behaviour
    Locked or lost secret: no fill and no secret shown; the right passphrase never opens a vault whose hardware secret is gone, and the app says so and offers an import instead of an empty vault.
  11. 11

    Location Anchor

    Allowed inputs
    Owner's explicit toggle action; one fresh location fix captured at toggle-on time; the owner's theft-recovery override setting.
    Allowed outputs
    A frozen anchor fix, with bounded jitter, served through the real-provider injection point (LocationProviderManager.setRealProvider, see docs/research/location-framework-api-verification.md) in place of a live fix while ON.
    Data classification
    The owner's own current-session location state.
    Privileges
    Provider-injection privilege equivalent to setRealProvider for the four standard location providers; no network, no other app's data, no Binder/file/root/shell authority beyond that injection point.
    Explicit denials
    Serving the anchor fix to the emergency-location path (always real, unconditional); serving it to the theft-recovery lookup unless the owner's explicit override is enabled; any persisted, timestamped record of on/off transitions; any API surface exposing past anchor state.
    Audit events
    None, by design — see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-12-location-anchor-design.md and ADR-037: a persisted history is a liability against the exact adversary this feature defends against, not an oversight.
    Failure behaviour
    Mid-session service restart fails closed to no-fix rather than passing through a real fix; reboot preserves the prior on/off state and anchor point without creating a new record.
  12. 12

    Duress Unlock

    Allowed inputs
    Owner's explicit setup action (decoy profile creation, separate challenge PIN); the exact credential typed at the primary keyguard on every unlock attempt.
    Allowed outputs
    Either a normal unlock into the real profile, or — on a decoy-credential match — a direct foreground switch into the pre-provisioned, isolated decoy profile with the real profile explicitly force-stopped.
    Data classification
    The owner's own credential-match outcome and current foreground-profile state; no third-party data.
    Privileges
    Primary-keyguard credential-check hook (dual-credential comparison); real-profile force-stop authority equivalent to UserController.stopUser (INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL), see docs/research/duress-unlock-api-verification.md.
    Explicit denials
    Nested decoys; any persisted record of which credential was entered, when, or how often; counting a successful decoy match as a failed real-profile attempt; auto-generated decoy content; any indicator visible while the decoy profile is foregrounded.
    Audit events
    None, by design — a decoy-unlock event must be indistinguishable, after the fact, from a normal unlock; see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-12-duress-unlock-design.md.
    Failure behaviour
    A credential-check failure against both real and decoy profiles counts as one normal failed attempt against the real profile only; a hook failure or crash fails closed to today's single-credential unlock path and never reveals the decoy profile; reboot never preserves which profile was last shown — every unlock is decided fresh.

Read from docs/security/capability-boundaries.md.