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Abuse cases

The ways a privileged path could be abused, the control each one requires and the test evidence for it.

1Privileged-path abuse cases

  1. 1

    AI privilege escalation

    Required control
    Broker denies shell, root, arbitrary Binder/file reads, and direct policy mutation.
    Test evidence
    Typed-tool denial tests.
  2. 2

    Cross-World data leakage

    Required control
    Profile-bound storage/policy and explicit user share contract.
    Test evidence
    Cross-profile isolation and approved-share tests.
  3. 3

    Recovery bypass

    Required control
    Signed factory/recovery artifacts and verified-boot-preserving flow.
    Test evidence
    Tampered-image and interrupted-recovery tests.
  4. 4

    Location Anchor emergency/theft-recovery bypass leakage

    Required control
    Emergency location is checked before the anchor and always wins, unconditionally; the theft-recovery lookup defaults to the real fix and is owner-overridable only through an explicit setting.
    Test evidence
    Simulated-emergency fix-source test; theft-recovery default-path and override-setting tests.
  5. 5

    Location Anchor history persistence

    Required control
    No component may write a timestamped record of Location Anchor's on/off transitions, anchor coordinates, or duration to any store, log, or backup path.
    Test evidence
    Negative test: a full toggle cycle produces zero new persisted artifacts beyond the single current-state record.
  6. 6

    Duress Unlock reveals the real profile under a decoy credential

    Required control
    The keyguard hook must route a decoy-credential match exclusively to the decoy profile; on any hook failure or error path it must fail closed to today's single-credential behavior, never falling through to reveal the real profile.
    Test evidence
    Simulated decoy-vs-real credential collision and hook-failure tests confirming fail-closed-to-normal-path behavior.
  7. 7

    Duress Unlock persists evidence of its own use

    Required control
    No component may write a timestamped record of which credential was entered, when a decoy match occurred, or which profile was last foregrounded, to any store, log, or backup path; a successful decoy match must never count as a failed attempt against the real profile's own lockout counter.
    Test evidence
    Negative test: a full setup-and-decoy-unlock-and-return cycle produces zero new persisted artifacts beyond the pre-existing profile/credential registration.
  8. 8

    Malformed proprietary Bluetooth packet compromises a privileged parser

    Required control
    Memory-safe implementation where feasible, bounded schemas, fuzzing, malformed-input tests, minimal parser authority.
    Test evidence
    AIR-015.
  9. 9

    Stale AirPods location is presented as current

    Required control
    Evidence state and timestamp are mandatory; current state expires immediately when its observation ends.
    Test evidence
    AIR-005, AIR-006.
  10. 10

    One AirPods component's location is assigned to another

    Required control
    Component-specific identity and record; no group inference.
    Test evidence
    AIR-002, AIR-004.
  11. 11

    Malicious app reads AirPods accessory location

    Required control
    Profile-bound private storage and no exported content provider or broad Binder interface.
    Test evidence
    AIR-011.
  12. 12

    Phishing through the optional Apple Find My setup

    Required control
    Exact allow-listed HTTPS origin, browser-owned authentication, visible hostname, no embedded credential surface.
    Test evidence
    AIR-013.
  13. 13

    Apple Find My service outage breaks ordinary AirPods use

    Required control
    The Apple path remains optional and external; local finding and Bluetooth audio remain independent.
    Test evidence
    AIR-014.
  14. 14

    AirPods firmware update silently changes the proprietary protocol

    Required control
    Exact capability registry; changed firmware downgrades to UNKNOWN; revalidate before restoring the claim.
    Test evidence
    AIR-016.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.