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Attackers

Who could attack ObliviOS, the path each takes, and what mitigates, detects and repairs it, with the risk that remains.

1Attacker catalogue

  1. 1

    malicious app

    Path
    Misuses permission, overlay, accessibility, background work, or IPC.
    Mitigation
    Sandbox, scopes, typed policies.
    Detection
    Unexpected resource use, policy denial, anomalous pattern.
    Recovery
    Revoke, restrict, freeze, or remove via typed action.
    Residual risk
    Granted permissions may be abused before detection.
  2. 2

    compromised app update

    Path
    Adds SDK, permission, endpoint, or background behaviour.
    Mitigation
    Difference scanning, signature verification, baseline comparison.
    Detection
    Manifest, SDK, destination, or event change.
    Recovery
    Restrict, isolate, roll back when supported, or remove.
    Residual risk
    Dormant/server-controlled abuse may evade analysis.
  3. 3

    Tracker SDK

    Path
    Exfiltrates identifiers or correlates activity.
    Mitigation
    Per-app networking, classification, profile isolation.
    Detection
    Unexpected destination, volume, or timing.
    Recovery
    Block destination or background traffic.
    Residual risk
    Encryption and domain fronting limit certainty.
  4. 4

    network attacker

    Path
    Observes, manipulates, or blocks traffic.
    Mitigation
    TLS, certificate validation, signed updates.
    Detection
    TLS or update signature failure.
    Recovery
    Reject connection/artifact and use trusted recovery path.
    Residual risk
    Availability can be denied.
  5. 5

    stolen device

    Path
    Attempts offline access or coercive use.
    Mitigation
    Encryption, hardware keys, lockscreen, auto-reboot, profiles.
    Detection
    Failed unlock patterns and configured alerts.
    Recovery
    Lock/reboot per user policy.
    Residual risk
    An unlocked current session remains exposed.
  6. 6

    Co-located adversary with legitimate access

    Path
    Views, or compels an unlock of, the owner's own device (partner, family member, employer) and inspects location-sharing state.
    Mitigation
    Location Anchor's no-persisted-history design: no on/off event is ever written down, so there is nothing to find.
    Detection
    N/A by design — only the current toggle state is observable; there is no history to detect.
    Recovery
    N/A — there is no past record to recover or protect.
    Residual risk
    The status-bar icon (drawn from an interchangeable glyph set) is visible to this adversary if they view the unlocked screen while anchoring is active; the glyph set raises the bar against a casual glance, not against a repeat or attentive observer who already knows it.
  7. 7

    Coercive adversary compelling unlock

    Path
    Physically or legally forces the owner to unlock the device on demand (border search, robbery, an abusive partner) and inspects whatever is shown.
    Mitigation
    Duress Unlock: a second, separately-credentialed, fully isolated decoy profile that a distinct PIN routes directly into at the primary lockscreen, with the real profile force-stopped and never shown.
    Detection
    N/A by design — a decoy unlock is, from every observable signal, a normal unlock.
    Recovery
    N/A — there is no real-profile state exposed to recover from; the owner simply unlocks normally with the real credential at the next opportunity.
    Residual risk
    A sufficiently informed adversary who already suspects ObliviOS ships this feature could demand proof the shown profile is the only one, or examine the OS image offline for the dual-credential-check code path; timing side-channels between a wrong PIN, a decoy-match PIN, and a real-match PIN are a residual risk pending constant-time implementation.
  8. 8

    Physical attacker

    Path
    Uses ports, boot mode, firmware downgrade, or hardware access.
    Mitigation
    Locked bootloader, verified boot, rollback protection, USB policy.
    Detection
    Boot failure or rollback rejection.
    Recovery
    Refuse untrusted boot and restore signed system.
    Residual risk
    Sophisticated hardware attacks can exceed OS controls.
  9. 9

    Compromised build worker

    Path
    Alters source, dependency, or artifact.
    Mitigation
    Pinned manifest, isolated builds, provenance, reproducibility, offline signing.
    Detection
    Hash/provenance mismatch.
    Recovery
    Quarantine, rebuild, rotate exposed credentials.
    Residual risk
    Coordinated source/reviewer/signing compromise is high impact.
  10. 10

    Compromised update server

    Path
    Substitutes, stales, or withholds updates.
    Mitigation
    Signed metadata, rollback protection, mirrors, staged channels.
    Detection
    Signature/version/availability anomaly.
    Recovery
    Reject, pause, publish advisory, use factory image.
    Residual risk
    Availability can be reduced.
  11. 11

    Hostile prompt

    Path
    Tries to induce AI disclosure or action.
    Mitigation
    Minimized inputs, typed allow-list, validation, no shell/root/file authority.
    Detection
    Invalid tool request or denied capability.
    Recovery
    Deny, audit, explain safely.
    Residual risk
    Explanation quality can still be manipulated.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.