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Abuse cases

The ways a privileged path could be abused, the control each one requires and the test evidence for it.

1Privileged-path abuse cases

  1. 43

    An address string or the address file crashes system_server or stalls the netd callbacks

    Required control
    The lookup runs on the service thread, never in the callback; the reader never throws on input, resolves no name, refuses a file whose sections are out of place or larger than 256 MB, and the service then runs with no address data.
    Test evidence
    MAP-032
  2. 44

    A contacted address outlives its lookup

    Required control
    Only the kind, country, city, coordinates, AS number and operator are kept, in memory with the row; the address is neither stored, persisted nor sent in the snapshot, and the history keeps the server place of a row only when the user chose to.
    Test evidence
    MAP-032, MAP-034
  3. 45

    One long row makes the whole history unreadable

    Required control
    A row of the history file is at most 1024 characters, the bound of the decoder; the encoder leaves a place out of a row that would pass it and a row that is too long even without one is not written, so that the decoder never refuses a file for one row. The reader refuses a file over 64 MB and an unreadable history is started again, so the writer keeps the file under 56 MB by leaving out the oldest days (never the newest).
    Test evidence
    MAP-034
  4. 46

    The reply to the app outgrows the Binder buffer

    Required control
    The entries of a reply are bounded in bytes (512 KB, counted as the parcel holds them, the longest names included) as well as in number, and the evidence of a link is cut to 16 service keys (300 links at most); the rows seen most recently that fit are kept.
    Test evidence
    MAP-035
  5. 47

    A damaged page of the mapped address file stops system_server

    Required control
    The file is mapped read-only from /system, which dm-verity verifies; a block that fails verification fails every mapped system file alike (the dex files of system_server included), so the file adds no case of its own [assumption: not tested on a device].
    Test evidence
    MAP-032
  6. 48

    Two apps join one person through a stable device value that an app reads without a permission

    Required control
    The five unit ro.boot.* properties are made unreadable by apps and by the app zygotes, and the bias estimates of the uncalibrated sensors are folded into the readings for every app uid [measured on the lynx image 2026101406; stallion not run]. Boot identity (boot_id, boot time) and the model, build, locale and time zone stay readable and are a documented residual (ADR-167).
    Test evidence
    IDS-001 (host), IDS-002 (build), IDS-003, IDS-004, IDS-008 and IDS-009 pass; IDS-005 and IDS-007 are partial (compass, eSIM and stallion not run).
  7. 49

    An app reads the bias through a direct sensor channel, which bypasses the sensor service connection

    Required control
    The HAL accepts such a channel from an ordinary app (measured); configureChannel refuses the three types for an app uid (ADR-167 (2)) [measured on the lynx image 2026101406].
    Test evidence
    IDS-006 (configured on the baseline, refused with the patches).
  8. 50

    Two apps on one device exchange a value over the loopback interface, or by a broadcast or multicast datagram on it, and so join themselves to one person

    Required control
    A BPF program refuses loopback traffic between two apps of different app ids unless one side holds USE_LOOPBACK_INTERFACE, which is a runtime permission since ADR-174 (ADR-179 adds the datagram case); the global setting oblivios_loopback_open turns the refusal off and can be written only by a caller that holds WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS (the shell and system apps). Accepted limit: an app that does not declare the permission can be exempted only by that global setting until a policy store exists. The kernel verifier accepts the program with the datagram rule [measured, weak]: bpfloader loads it at every boot and the log of the boot of 2026102101 holds no invalid, fail or error line (IMG-012); the datagram refusal itself was not exercised.
    Test evidence
    LNK-006 (PASS), LNK-013 (NOT_RUN)
  9. 51

    An app learns device-specific values from settings tables, from the clipboard, from the vibrator calibration, from the device colour and country of origin, or from MediaStore.getVersion without any permission

    Required control
    Ordinary apps read 40 listed settings keys; the clipboard is readable only through a paste (a clip change reaches the app that set the clip and a paste-grant holder), and a denied caller gets the same answer for every clip; the vibrator calibration is rounded, the colour and country hidden from third-party apps, and the MediaStore version hashed per app (ADR-174, ADR-179). The switches oblivios_settings_open and oblivios_settings_real_packages turn the settings view off for everyone or per package and can be written only by a caller that holds WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS. Accepted cost: apps that read a hidden key fail or get no value, and a denied clipboard caller sees a clip that is always there, so Paste is always offered.
    Test evidence
    LNK-007 (PARTIAL), LNK-008, LNK-009, LNK-012 (PASS), LNK-010 (PARTIAL), LNK-014 (NOT_RUN)
  10. 52

    An app set to Tor leaves the device Direct, or another app joins itself to it by the public address

    Required control
    The exit app sets the platform preference for the chosen uids before it contacts the daemon, and the route helper writes guard rules (priorities 13520 to 13523) that refuse an app on Tor any network but the Tor network, also when the app binds a socket to the Wi-Fi network; the rule band lies behind the secure-VPN rule, so an app under a user VPN is neither masked nor routed to Tor and the exit app says so (ADR-186). The preference does not survive a reboot (measured), so the exit app sets it again at boot. Accepted limits: local-network devices fail for an app on Tor; DNS of an app with its own encrypted resolver is not seen.
    Test evidence
    NET-001b and NET-008 (PASS by hand-written rules), NET-007, NET-009, NET-002, NET-004 (NOT_RUN)
  11. 53

    A listed advertising or analytics host learns the public address of an app, or the masked tier slows what the user waits for

    Required control
    Only listed third-party hosts of an app set to the masked class leave through Tor, by a fake address per app and name; unlisted names are never given a fake address; no Tor contact happens before the one device-wide consent; a company that sends an app 4 MiB within a minute is passed on for 30 minutes and the user is told once (ADR-188). Accepted: a host that wants to be unmasked can do it by sending 4 MiB; a hold of 30 minutes ends; the consent is the owner's for every user of the device.
    Test evidence
    MSK-002c, MSK-003 to MSK-007, MSK-011 to MSK-013 (NOT_RUN)
  12. 54

    A compromised exit daemon, exit app or route helper

    Required control
    The daemon runs as its own uid in its own domain with the tun, sock_diag and the Tor client and no framework right; it cannot write a route (the helper does, inside the band, for the exit app only); the exit app holds NETWORK_FACTORY and CONTROL_OEM_PAID_NETWORK_PREFERENCE and no INTERNET; both control sockets accept only their one peer by SELinux type and length-check every frame before allocating. The daemon sees the destinations of masked apps (the Data Map has the same class of data); a compromised app could send the helper only rule shapes of the closed language.
    Test evidence
    The close-out review R1 to R22 and check-neverallows.sh; NET-009 (NOT_RUN)
  13. 55

    Another app or a stolen copy of the app storage learns which sites have an account in the Passwords app

    Required control
    The domain index holds HMAC-SHA-256 tags (16 bytes) of the exact registrable domain and package, keyed by a non-exportable hardware key that needs no authentication; the lookup exists only inside the autofill service and no API, intent or provider exposes it; it is never in a backup or export. Accepted residuals (ADR-185, spec 4.1): whoever uses the unlocked phone learns whether an account exists by opening a site; code running as the app's uid can use the key to test guesses; after the first unlock the size of the index shows how many distinct sites have an account (not padded in version 1).
    Test evidence
    PWM-004 (what the locked dropdown shows); the host tests of the index in vault-core/tests/index.rs.
  14. 56

    A look-alike address receives the password of another site

    Required control
    Only the exact registrable domain of the public suffix list matches, in the lower-case punycode form; a name with a path, user info, an IP form or a character outside the host alphabet has none; a package is never a domain and the reverse. The list is a snapshot compiled in.
    Test evidence
    vault-core/tests/index.rs (look-alikes, IP literals, ports, public suffixes, RFC 3492 samples); mutation run PWM-002.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.