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Abuse cases

The ways a privileged path could be abused, the control each one requires and the test evidence for it.

1Privileged-path abuse cases

  1. 57

    An app that is not a browser, or a page inside an app, asks for the password of another site

    Required control
    The autofill framework passes on any webDomain an app writes into its view structure and checks nothing, so the app believes a website only from Vanadium (while it is a system app) and from browsers the owner trusts, each bound to its signer digest and added after a fresh confirmation (an unlock or confirmation less than 60 seconds old counts, ADR-215); every other browser gets nothing, a browser is never matched or linked by its package, an app is answered by its package only when its screen shows no website, and a trusted browser's screen with two sites or an http page gets nothing (ADR-193). A page inside a trusted browser is the browser's to isolate.
    Test evidence
    PWM-015, PWM-016, PWM-019; host side OriginTest.
  2. 58

    The vault key leaves the secure process for an instant

    Required control
    The vault key is random and exists in memory only while the vault is open. It passes through the JVM when the biometric wrapper is made (vaultKey) and when it is opened (the Keystore unwrap), and is overwritten in the same call. Residual of per-use Keystore unwrapping; a heap dump of the app in that instant could read it.
    Test evidence
    PWM-007; no device evidence yet.
  3. 59

    Passwords stay in the heap after an export or import

    Required control
    The JSON text and the parsed values of an export hold passwords in heap copies that are not all wiped; they live for one export or import. Residual, accepted for version 1.
    Test evidence
    Not tested; stated here.
  4. 60

    The password list of another manager stays readable after an import, or a login waits unprotected for the unlock

    Required control
    A CSV export holds every password in the clear. The app asks once, says to delete the file and wipes its own copy, but it cannot delete the user's file or its flash blocks; that is an accepted residual of reading other managers' exports (ADR-190). A login submitted while the vault is locked waits in the memory of the app process only, for two minutes, and is wiped when taken, replaced, cleared or expired; the intent that starts the unlock carries nothing.
    Test evidence
    vault-core/tests/csvimport.rs; PendingSave host checks; PWM-012, PWM-013.
  5. 61

    A hostile vault or export file crashes or exhausts the app

    Required control
    Every length is checked against the bytes that remain before anything is allocated; Argon2 parameters are validated against hard limits before any hashing; fields, lists and counts have limits; the code reachable from the JNI surface may not panic (clippy deny list); the release profile aborts.
    Test evidence
    vault-core/tests/vault.rs, exchange.rs, csvimport.rs, jni_handles.rs; PWM-001, PWM-002.
  6. 62

    The vault cannot be opened after the hardware secret is lost

    Required control
    Accepted risk of the hardware binding (owner decision 2026-10-20): the app detects the missing key, never shows an empty vault, never makes a new key by itself, and offers a new vault only on request; the export file is the backup.
    Test evidence
    PWM-008.
  7. 63

    A secret reaches a screenshot, the recents list, the clipboard history, a log or a saved state

    Required control
    Every window sets FLAG_SECURE; the clipboard entry is marked sensitive and cleared after 30 seconds; no log or print call and no rememberSaveable in the app (host checks); the activity saves no instance state.
    Test evidence
    PWM-003 (host guards), PWM-009 on a device.
  8. 64

    A wrong passphrase is tried again and again

    Required control
    Argon2id with a hardware secret mixed in, a software throttle that grows to five minutes and never wipes the vault, and five failed biometric attempts that require the passphrase.
    Test evidence
    LockPolicyTest (host); PWM-006, PWM-007.
  9. 65

    A keyboard reads the username of a chip, or learns that a site has an account, how many accounts it has or whether the vault is locked, from the chips in its strip (ADR-191, proposed)

    Required control
    The system draws a chip in ExtServices and hands the keyboard a surface and click notifications, never the text [verified-in-source: InlineSuggestionRenderService.java, InlineSuggestion.java]. Chips are built only for the system keyboard (ChipPolicy.TRUSTED_KEYBOARDS); the name comes from a request that the input method manager checks against the bound keyboard. Any other keyboard gets the system list, which no keyboard sees. The system keyboard sets an exact size for every chip, so a width tells nothing about the text, and its build guards fail on any source that reads the info, hints, slice or surface of a suggestion, on a log or toast in the chip classes and on a network, frame-buffer or log permission. Residual: the system keyboard is in reach of the number of chips and of when they appear (a site has an account; with the vault open, how many); it is built not to use them.
    Test evidence
    ACH-001, ACH-003, ACH-011, ACH-016; host only so far.
  10. 66

    A keyboard probes the stored username or password by watching which chips stay while it types

    Required control
    Every dataset field has a null filter, so a chip and a list entry go at the first typed character and the system never compares typed text with the stored value (the default filter is a prefix match, which would keep the entry while the typed text is a prefix) [verified-in-source: ui/InlineFillUi.java, ui/FillUi.java]; a build guard fails on a dataset value added without it.
    Test evidence
    ACH-003 (guard and its tests), ACH-014.
  11. 67

    ExtServices, which draws the chips, sees the usernames and holds INTERNET

    Required control
    The password is never in a chip; a locked vault shows the generic words only. ExtServices is platform code of the image. Residual, accepted for now: its INTERNET and QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES permissions are in the source tree [verified-in-source: packages/modules/ExtServices/AndroidManifest.xml] and a run-time restriction was not checked; restricting its network is a follow-up outside ADR-191.
    Test evidence
    ACH-016 records the process that draws the chip and its permissions.

Read from docs/security/threat-model.md.