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ObliviOS Capability Boundaries

What each service may take in, give out and do, and what it is denied.

Each service has a narrow interface. Denied capabilities must later become platform permission, Binder, SELinux, storage, and test policy.

  1. 13

    Exit daemon (Proposed, ADR-184, ADR-186 and ADR-187; built and packaged, in lynx image 2026102301 (IMG-013), flashed 2026-10-23)

    Allowed inputs
    Packets that the kernel delivers into its tun interface, among them the DNS queries of masked uids and the packets to the fake address range; the mask list file of the image; the uid classes and per-company overrides from the exit app; the owner uid of a flow from sock_diag; typed messages from the exit app (state query, uid classes, per-company overrides, "Hide again" for a promoted company, set the memory cap, refresh the circuits of an app, shutdown); the Tor directory and the relays, as a network client.
    Allowed outputs
    Packets written to the tun; connections through the Tor network; to the exit app only: the name of its tun interface, an up or down state and counts of failed connections per uid and company id and the companies that the speed guard passes on to an app for 30 minutes (uid and company id; never a host name).
    Data classification
    Destinations and timing of each app's connections; sensitive because it reveals app usage and, with the masked class of ADR-181, which listed hosts each app contacts.
    Privileges
    CAP_NET_ADMIN only; the tun device with TUNSETIFF and TUNGETIFF; the sock_diag netlink socket; ordinary internet sockets as its own uid, which stays outside every preference; the control channel.
    Explicit denials
    Any framework permission, any Binder service other than the control channel, a routing-table or netfilter write, a socket mark, should_protect for an app (it lets an app leave the tunnel), reading app data or storage, writing a destination or host name to storage or a log, telemetry, a relay operated by the project, serving any caller other than the exit app.
    Audit events
    Start, stop and restart; bootstrap complete or failed; a circuit refresh requested; a refused quota request. Counts only, never destinations: the failure reports (uid, company id, count) travel with the answer to a state query, and a refused request gets an error code with its sequence number. A started daemon prints one fixed line when it is up.
    Failure behaviour
    Fail closed for apps set to Tor (no network, as ADR-178); never fall back to Direct; refuse a flow that cannot be attributed to a uid instead of giving it a shared key; restart by init after a panic (the build aborts on panic).
  2. 14

    Route helper (Proposed, ADR-186; built and packaged, in lynx image 2026102301 (IMG-013), flashed 2026-10-23)

    Allowed inputs
    Typed route specifications from the exit app (an interface name, two lists of uid ranges of at least 10000, an optional network id; the tun addresses are constants of the rule language).
    Allowed outputs
    Rules in the priority band 13100 to 13999, one default route in table 4747, the address and up state of the tun interface; an acknowledgement or an error code to the exit app.
    Data classification
    The uid ranges of apps that are masked or set to Tor (no destination, no packet, no name).
    Privileges
    CAP_NET_ADMIN; netlink_route_socket with nlmsg_write limited by allowxperm to the rule, route, address and link messages; the control socket from init.
    Explicit denials
    Any internet or Unix socket other than the control socket, the Tor network, a rule outside the band or the table, a uid below 10000, reading app data, storage, a name or a packet, serving any caller other than the exit app, a netfilter write.
    Audit events
    Applied, cleared, refused (with the error code). Counts only.
    Failure behaviour
    On a crash init restarts it and the exit app sends the specification again; rules stay in the kernel meanwhile, and a missing tun makes the steering rules fall through, which is the measured behaviour (MSK-008).
  3. 15

    Exit app (Proposed, ADR-184, ADR-186 and ADR-187; built and packaged, in lynx image 2026102301 (IMG-013), flashed 2026-10-23)

    Allowed inputs
    The user's choice per app (Direct, Tor or an own profile) and the masked-destinations setting; the status messages of the daemon; the package list.
    Allowed outputs
    The OemNetworkPreferences; the registered network and its link properties; notifications and the Settings rows; typed messages to the daemon (uid classes, overrides) and to the route helper (the route specification).
    Data classification
    The user's per-app exit choice and the pairs (package, company id) of the hosts the user chose to show an address to, in device-protected storage (a company id is stable: privacy/exit/mask-company-ids.tsv, ADR-186); per-app counts of failed connections, kept in RAM only.
    Privileges
    NETWORK_FACTORY and CONTROL_OEM_PAID_NETWORK_PREFERENCE (signature level), platform-signed; no capability, not NETWORK_STACK, no tun, no sock_diag.
    Explicit denials
    Creating a tun, reading a flow or a packet, looking up uids, contacting the Tor network, storing destinations, accepting a preference change from another app, any network request of its own.
    Audit events
    Preference changed (app, class), network registered or unregistered, failure notification shown.
    Failure behaviour
    If the daemon is down, mark the network down and show the message of ADR-178; keep the stored choices and never clear a preference silently; re-apply the preferences at boot before apps start, because the platform does not persist the preference map (finding F11 of the review).
  4. 16

    Compartments platform closures (Proposed, ADR-173, ADR-174, ADR-175, ADR-179; patches in privacy/linkability and privacy/identity-surface, built into lynx images up to 2026102101)

    Allowed inputs
    The caller's uid and package, the permissions it holds (USE_LOOPBACK_INTERFACE, a paste grant), the three global settings oblivios_loopback_open, oblivios_settings_open and oblivios_settings_real_packages.
    Allowed outputs
    A refused loopback, broadcast or multicast datagram; a settings read that answers unset; a clipboard answer that is the same for every clip; a rounded vibrator calibration; hidden device colour and country; a per-app hash of MediaStore.getVersion; hidden ro.boot.* unit properties; sensor readings with the bias folded in.
    Data classification
    The values themselves are the identifiers of the device; the policy holds no new data.
    Privileges
    No new permission, capability or endpoint. USE_LOOPBACK_INTERFACE changes from normal to dangerous (a runtime permission); the three settings switches are Global keys and need WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS to change.
    Explicit denials
    A new service, a new exported component, any logging of what an app read or was denied, a per-app policy store (not built; the switches are all-or-nothing or per package name), and a weakening of the loopback, settings or clipboard checks for system uids.
    Audit events
    The drops of the BPF loopback program in the metrics ring buffer; no per-app log.
    Failure behaviour
    Fail closed for the denied value: an app that needs a hidden key sees it unset, and the three switches restore the stock behaviour without a reflash.
  5. 17

    Recovery

    Allowed inputs
    Verified local recovery action.
    Allowed outputs
    Signed-system restoration status.
    Data classification
    Recovery metadata, never decrypted content.
    Privileges
    Recovery environment APIs.
    Explicit denials
    Unsigned boot, rollback bypass, arbitrary extraction.
    Audit events
    Verification, restore/failure, reset.
    Failure behaviour
    Halt untrusted flow; show safe options.
  6. 18

    AI broker

    Allowed inputs
    Minimized facts and explicit user intent.
    Allowed outputs
    Explanation, preview, typed action request.
    Data classification
    Structured incident/action facts.
    Privileges
    No direct privileged authority.
    Explicit denials
    Root, shell, arbitrary Binder, arbitrary file reads, direct policy mutation, package-manager/vault/backup/network authority.
    Audit events
    Prompt class, tool request, denial, approved handoff.
    Failure behaviour
    Refuse safely; never execute unvalidated request.
  7. 19

    AirPods compatibility service

    Allowed inputs
    Bonded accessory identity, declared model/firmware, bounded Bluetooth messages, connection events, owner-enabled location snapshot, typed control ID.
    Allowed outputs
    Normalized component status, typed supported control result, latest local record, one allow-listed browser intent, one owner-initiated sanitized diagnostic export file; a Settings-facing device-settings provider service and an icon content provider, each reachable only by holders of BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED (spec 2026-09-29-airpods-settings-ui-design.md ยง8).
    Data classification
    Accessory technical metadata and owner-private precise location.
    Privileges
    Bluetooth connection and bounded scanning; profile-bound encrypted storage; a location snapshot only when the owner enabled local finding; one non-SDK API exemption scoped to this service alone; BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED only if the chosen provider-registration route needs it (open decision O2, to be justified and reviewed).
    Explicit denials
    Unknown-device mapping, arbitrary Bluetooth scanning, arbitrary web URLs, Apple credentials/cookies/attestation tokens, direct Apple Find My network access, AI export, telemetry, coordinate logging, device-wide Vendor ID spoofing, Xposed/root/general hooking frameworks, arbitrary Binder, shell, or filesystem access.
    Audit events
    Enable, disable, clear, control request, control result, and failure reason (non-coordinate).
    Failure behaviour
    No fabricated state; retain the last valid component record when safe; mark current state unavailable; never block Bluetooth audio or ordinary SystemUI.
  8. 20

    Data Map collector

    Allowed inputs
    DNS lookup events (uid, hostname, resolved address count, time) and TCP connect events (uid, destination address, port, time) from NetdEventListenerService; a uid's foreground or background state; the user's retention choice; the read-only classifier file; the read-only address file (ADR-161: hosting country, city, ASN, operator and anycast flag of an address).
    Allowed outputs
    DataMapEntry aggregates, derived DataMapLink records and the classifier's DataMapRelation records, to the holder of READ_DATA_MAP, for the calling user only.
    Data classification
    Technical metadata about destinations; sensitive because it reveals app usage.
    Privileges
    One callback slot in NetdEventListenerService; read of a uid's process importance; own per-user file under the credential-encrypted system directory, only while history is on (and the server places of a row only when the user chose to keep them).
    Explicit denials
    Packet content, URLs, query strings, bytes per destination, keeping an address after its lookup, own network requests, export in any form, cross-user reads, access by any app other than DataMapApp, raw-event access for the AI broker, any disk write while history is off, inclusion in backup, fetching a list or update.
    Audit events
    History on or off, duration changed, data cleared, collecting on or off.
    Failure behaviour
    Drop events on error or overload; never block or fail resolution or connections; deny reads without the permission; start empty on a corrupt file.
  9. 21

    Data Map app

    Allowed inputs
    The snapshot of the collector for the calling user; the user's touches; the package list, icons and labels of installed apps.
    Allowed outputs
    Pixels on the screen; the user's settings choices back to the collector; one new text file, only when the user confirms the dialog of Settings, through the system document picker (ADR-189).
    Data classification
    Technical metadata about destinations; the names and icons of installed apps.
    Privileges
    READ_DATA_MAP; QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES for icons and labels only.
    Explicit denials
    INTERNET and any other network permission, any service, receiver, provider or alarm, writing files of its own or sharing or exporting any data other than the one user-driven file of ADR-189 (no storage permission, no share target, nothing written at any other time), reading any app's data, shipping any app's logo as a file (company logos only as ADR-159 allows).
    Audit events
    None of its own; settings changes are audited by the collector.
    Failure behaviour
    Show an empty map and say so when the service is unavailable; an app with no usable icon shows its initials.
  10. 22

    Sensor service identity fold

    Allowed inputs
    Uncalibrated sensor events from the sensors HAL (type, three readings, three bias values) and the uid of the receiving connection.
    Allowed outputs
    The same event with the bias folded into the readings and reported as zero, for every app uid (uid % AID_USER_OFFSET >= AID_APP_START).
    Data classification
    Sensor readings (motion and orientation, sensitive).
    Privileges
    One transformation in SensorEventConnection::sendEvents under the existing mConnectionLock; no new permission, service, IPC or file [assumption: the patch is written but neither built nor run; the host test IDS-001 proves the arithmetic and the uid rule, not the integration in sendEvents].
    Explicit denials
    Any other change of a reading, noise injection, a change for a native daemon or a platform uid, storage, logging or transmission of events.
    Audit events
    None; the change is silent by design.
    Failure behaviour
    A bias that is not finite is dropped and the readings stay as delivered; an event is never dropped.
  11. 23

    Unit boot properties

    Allowed inputs
    ro.boot.cdt_hwid, ro.boot.hardware.devcfg, ro.boot.hardware.pcbcfg, ro.boot.hw.soc.id, ro.boot.vbmeta.device, set by init from the kernel command line [verified-in-source: private/property_contexts, comment above the ro.boot. prefix].
    Allowed outputs
    Reads by every domain except appdomain, app_zygote and native_app_zygote (SELinux type unit_boot_prop); shell is in appdomain.
    Data classification
    Device-specific identifiers.
    Privileges
    get_prop({ domain -appdomain -app_zygote -native_app_zygote }, unit_boot_prop); no allow rule for an app [measured: compiled (IDS-002); on the lynx image 2026101406 the five names are absent for two apps and for an app-zygote preload (IDS-003, IDS-009); stallion not run].
    Explicit denials
    Any read by an app, any write by a ObliviOS component, any copy into a log, snapshot or export by a ObliviOS component.
    Audit events
    SELinux denials of the type in logcat -b all.
    Failure behaviour
    An app that reads one gets an empty value; every other domain is unchanged.

Read from docs/security/capability-boundaries.md.