- Decision
- ADR-181
- Date
- 2026-10-19
- Status
- ProposedProposed (owner direction 2026-10-19: no regression, handled failures, user choice by notification; the confirmation at setup is a recommendation the owner has not yet confirmed; not approved, nothing built; D-E to D-I open).
- Part
- Network exit
- Mentions
- ADR-178
- Mentioned by
- ADR-184, ADR-186, ADR-223
1Decision
Amend ADR-178: add a default exit class, masked destinations, as designed in 2026-10-19-compartments-masked-destinations-design.md. Flows to hosts of a mask list (the classifier categories advertising, analytics and attribution minus a deny list) leave through Tor; everything else stays Direct and on the kernel path.
A host that fails or is slow masked is retried on a fresh circuit, then refused at once, then the user gets one notification with the choice to show the address to that host or keep hiding it; nothing goes Direct without that choice. The Tor client starts only after a one-time confirmation in Setup Wizard (or one notification on a device already set up). A two-hop relay replaces Tor for the list when an operator exists.
The per-app Tor and own-profile classes of ADR-178 stay.
2Why and evidence
Joining of apps by address happens at shared third-party endpoints, which carry small requests and are a bounded list [measured: classifier.tsv, 3367 domains in the three categories]; Tor's late start (11 to 18 times) matters little for such requests but its failures on exit-blocking hosts do, hence the failure ladder and the user's choice. Apple's relay is paid and Google's covers a tracking-domain list only [web]; no free all-traffic path exists.
Rejected: Tor for all traffic of every app (ADR-178); a relay operated by the project; a silent Direct fall back (requirements.md:501); fake responses for a failed host (the stream is encrypted); hosts of integrity, banking, payment and anti-fraud services on the list.
3Consequences
Apps see no change except hosts that need the user's choice; the app's own servers still see the real address (the per-app classes remain for that); routing per destination needs a DNS-driven address set or an SNI split that is not built or measured; the exit service learns which listed hosts each app contacts and keeps it in RAM only; an ECH or in-app DoH client escapes the list [assumption].
4Review when
MSK-002 shows a regression that the failure ladder cannot remove; the routing mechanism cannot be built without slowing unlisted traffic (MSK-006); Arti on lynx is unusable; the owner decides that a list-only exit is not worth shipping.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-181.