- Decision
- ADR-178
- Date
- 2026-10-18
- Status
- ProposedProposed (owner direction 2026-10-18 after the Tor measurement: Direct default, Tor and own profile per app; not approved, nothing built; D-A to D-D open).
- Part
- Network exit
- Mentioned by
- ADR-180, ADR-181, ADR-184
1Decision
Offer a per-app network exit as designed in 2026-10-18-network-exit-design.md: the default stays Direct; the user sets each app to Direct, to Tor (one Tor circuit family per app, a Rust exit service with Arti) or to an own WireGuard profile; the selection is OemNetworkPreferences with an OEM_PRIVATE network for Tor and an OEM_PAID_ONLY network for the profile; an app set to an exit has no network when it is down; a message names Tor as the likely cause of a failure; UDP is refused at once on Tor and parked. The project operates and pays for no relay.
2Why and evidence
Per-app Tor exists in the Tor Project's own Tor VPN (beta, per-app circuits, Arti, Cure53 audit June 2025) [web]; no free, operator-free UDP exit was found [web]; per-uid selection without the VPN slot exists in the tree [verified-in-source: ConnectivityService.java:16300-16367], but setOemNetworkPreference is automotive-only for production preferences (:15953-15990), so a one-line Connectivity patch is part of the decision.
Rejected: Tor as the default for every app (measured 2026-10-18: 10 MB takes 6.6 to 89 times as long as Direct and a request starts 11 to 18 times later; the owner refused that regression); a relay run by the project as the default (the owner cannot pay for one, and an operator would see the traffic); a silent fall back to Direct (requirements.md:501).
3Consequences
Tor is slower than Direct and sites that block the public exit list fail on it, so it is a choice and not the default; apps that need UDP fail on Tor until switched to Direct; an own profile trusts the server or provider the user picked and needs the user to bring one; the packet layer and a user-space WireGuard are large new privileged components; version 1 has two exit classes (Tor and one profile), more need a per-app network patch; the review of 2026-10-18 found open problems (enforcement against an app that selects another network, DNS attribution, a VPN, boot and install windows) listed in the design, section 10a.
4Review when
The Tor measurement is not the issue any more; the packet layer cannot be reused or built within reason; the selection fails on a device (NET-001a, NET-001b); enforcement against explicit network selection cannot be built; the owner decides that an exit that an app can leave is not worth shipping.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-178.