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Accept Location Anchor (see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-12-location-anchor-design.md) as a narrow, explicit, owner-approved exception to the product compass's…

Accepted, recorded 12 August 2026.

Decision
ADR-037
Date
2026-08-12
Status
AcceptedAccepted
Mentioned by
ADR-168, ADR-208, ADR-214

1Decision

Accept Location Anchor (see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-12-location-anchor-design.md) as a narrow, explicit, owner-approved exception to the product compass's anti-falsification boundary, scoped to the device's own outbound location signal only.

2Why and evidence

During brainstorming for Location Anchor, the owner chose a system-server-level mechanism that makes the anchored location fix indistinguishable from a real one to every consumer on the device, not only location-sharing contacts — including third-party services that use location as an anti-fraud signal (delivery/rideshare trip verification, attendance/clock-in geofencing, safety check-ins).

The compass's existing "AegisOS never falsifies ... anti-fraud controls" sentence plainly covers that case. The owner's initial response ("it's opt-in, so that's fine") was pushed back on directly: opt-in does not itself remove the third-party fraud-detection exposure — a delivery app's fraud system cannot tell that the owner chose this deliberately.

The actual, narrower justification accepted here is that this exception concerns only the device's own owner-authored location signal (the owner's own data about themselves), not a third party's attestation, signature, DRM, payment, subscription, or identity verification, which the owner does not control and which remain absolute.

3Consequences

The product compass is amended (Daily-driver promise section) to carry this exact carve-out, naming this ADR. Location Anchor may proceed to an implementation plan. The two safety carve-outs inside Location Anchor itself are unaffected by this ADR and remain as designed: emergency location is always real, unconditionally; AegisOS's own theft-recovery lookup defaults to real location with an owner-facing opt-out. This ADR creates no precedent for any other feature; it applies to location falsification only.

4Review when

Any future feature proposing to falsify attestation, signatures, DRM, payment status, subscriptions, or identity checks must not cite this ADR — it is scoped to location only. Revisit if third-party legal/ToS exposure from anti-fraud circumvention becomes concrete (e.g. a platform policy conflict, partner integration request, or regulatory inquiry), or if Location Anchor's mechanism changes from Option B to something that no longer defeats third-party detection.

Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-037.