- Decision
- ADR-208
- Date
- 2026-10-30
- Status
- ProposedProposed (owner direction 2026-10-30; the design is not read by the owner; every patch is landed on the build server, host-checked and module-built (
CMP-021); nothing is in an image and no device row has run) - Part
- Compartments
- Mentions
- ADR-037, ADR-167, ADR-168, ADR-206
- Mentioned by
- ADR-209, ADR-211, ADR-214, ADR-235, ADR-250
1Decision
Give each app a profile of Compartments that the user can change, as designed in 2026-10-30-compartments-profiles-design.md: Trusted, Protected (the default) and Isolated, with per-class values Real data, Substitute data and Blocked for Motion sensors, Location, Other apps on this phone and Phone settings.
An Isolated app lives in one persona: a place (Automatic is a place in the user's own country, or a place the user chooses from an offline city list), the time zone of the place, a network exit in that country, substitute or real-motion sensors, and matching answers of the location-derived channels (cell identity, network country, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth scans); the location is the real track translated by one fixed vector per app.
Compartments never lowers the protection of an app by what the app says about itself; only the user sets Trusted. One policy store in system_server and one system service with a MANAGE permission (exit app only) and a READ_PROFILE permission (Settings only) carry the state; the App info row of Settings shows the profile.
Completes ADR-167 points 4 and 5, extends ADR-037 and ADR-168 from location and sensors to the location-derived signals of a persona, and replaces the first-version limits of ADR-206 (no switch, no per-app page).
2Why and evidence
The owner, on lynx 2026103001: the page shows only the address and the identity work cannot be seen or set [measured: ADR-206]. The owner asked for a profile per app that can be changed by hand, an app that demands location or sensors that keeps working, a fake location in a completely different place that the user can set, and an offline database.
[verified-in-source] the telephony gate is LocationAccessPolicy (TelephonyRegistry, PhoneInterfaceManager, ServiceStateProvider, NetworkScanRequestTracker); the provider structure and the emergency hook EmergencyHelper.isInEmergency are in location-framework-api-verification.md; the App info row reads no state of Compartments (AppCompartmentsPreference.kt); the exit app holds no WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS.
Rejected: an automatic mode that lowers protection by category, name or permissions (a tracker can claim any of them); a frozen fake fix (it contradicts the real motion); a Wi-Fi access point database (size, sensitivity); a provider of the exit app for the App info summary (a service method with its own permission is narrower to audit).
3Consequences
Isolated apps can still be noticed in the ways of section 7 of the design (a place in another country: magnetic field, air pressure, SIM country, cell detail; routes that ignore roads; empty Wi-Fi scans; behaviour with real motion); the page lists them. A new system service, a policy store and hooks in the sensor, location, telephony, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth paths are privileged changes held to the higher bar of AGENTS.md. Emergency location stays real. One plan, 2026-10-30-compartments-profiles.md, covers the store, the profiles, the pages and the location persona.
4Review when
The owner finds the names or the defaults wrong (D1); a licence or size of the offline data blocks the image (D4); a persona channel turns out not to be gateable per uid in source; an app class breaks under Protected that the closures did not break before.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-208.