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Home / Decisions / ADR-168

Accept a second narrow exception to the anti-falsification rule of the product compass, beside ADR-037.

Accepted, recorded 14 October 2026.

Decision
ADR-168
Date
2026-10-14
Status
AcceptedAccepted (owner, 2026-10-14).
Mentions
ADR-037
Mentioned by
ADR-208

1Decision

Accept a second narrow exception to the anti-falsification rule of the product compass, beside ADR-037: an owner-initiated, per-app, opt-in decoy for the sensors an app reads (accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, pressure, light and the like). The app receives physically plausible synthetic streams, not zeros, and only the app the owner chose; the system uid and every other app are unaffected.

The boundary of the Location Anchor design against faking motion sensors (2026-08-12) is restated: it holds for the system-wide Location Anchor, whose reasons (crash detection and the emergency-location flow) concern system consumers, and it does not apply to a per-app decoy that leaves the system uid alone.

2Why and evidence

Apps that demand the sensors permission as a condition are the owner's stated problem; users report that zeroed data crashes apps, so a decoy must be plausible (lane-feasibility.md, section 3). The same reasoning as ADR-037 applies: the stream is the owner's own device data, not a third party's attestation, signature, DRM, payment, subscription or identity verification, none of which are excepted. Opt-in by the owner does not stop a third party's behavioural-biometric fraud check from being defeated, which the owner accepts knowingly, as for the location signal.

3Consequences

The product compass is amended in the same change (Daily-driver promise): two exceptions, each scoped to its own signal, neither a precedent for attestation, signatures, DRM, payment, subscriptions or identity checks. The exception takes effect only for what is built; no code exists yet. An app may refuse to run when it detects a decoy, and the settings say so.

4Review when

A third data class asks for a decoy (each needs its own ADR); a decoy is found to defeat an attestation or DRM path; the emergency or crash-detection flow is found to read the decoy.

Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-168.