- Decision
- ADR-111
- Date
- 2026-09-28
- Status
- AcceptedAccepted
- Mentions
- ADR-050, ADR-110
- Mentioned by
- ADR-110, ADR-113
1Decision
Make Pixel 10a (stallion) the owner's daily-use device under Personal Stable (ADR-110); lynx stays the development and Alpha device.
Four scoped decisions: (1) once relocked, stallion receives only user-variant Personal Stable builds, never Alpha or development builds; (2) the stallion key set generated in the signing host's vault on 2026-09-28 (AVB public-key SHA-1 089b874ee4419a8c39c37374386a161a6cf2ee26) is re-designated from Alpha to stallion's Personal Stable key; (3) amend the design's guardrail (b): stallion's Personal Stable OTAs may be published on the project's existing private update server as stallion stable channel metadata; (4) every stallion ceremony runs with no disk-backed swap active on the signing host.
2Why and evidence
(1) Owner decision 2026-09-28: daily use on the newer device, keep developing on lynx, update by OTA. Relocking and unlocking both wipe userdata, so the device is relocked once, before any personal data, and updated only by signed OTA afterward. user because a userdebug build keeps adb root, which undoes much of what relocking buys on a daily device.
(2) The key set was generated the same day, per grapheneos.org/build, in the same encrypted vault and with the same handling the design requires. It is distinct from any public Stable key (none exists), which is the design's only key-distinctness rule. A second stallion key set would add a key nobody uses, in a vault already near its 3.8MB capacity. (3) The guardrail exists so that no other person's device receives the build.
A stallion Personal Stable OTA installs only on a device whose otacerts.zip carries this release certificate and whose bootloader has this AVB key enrolled: the owner's one unit. The existing server reuses the hardware-proven pipeline (ADR-050) and the Updater's built-in URL; the alternative, adb sideload from the workstation, gives up automatic updates.
Residual: anyone who guesses the URL can download the signed OTA zip, the same exposure ADR-050 already accepted for lynx Alpha builds; it contains no secrets. (4) The design retains "no swappable disk exposure for key material during a ceremony".
The 2026-09-27 lynx ceremony re-enabled disk swap on the signing host to get past an OOM (docs/product/2026-09-27-upstream-update-2026091900-session.md); tolerated for Alpha then, not allowed for Personal Stable.
3Consequences
Supersedes the Alpha designation in docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-27-stallion-device-onboarding.md Task 5, and that plan's Tasks 6-8, replaced by docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-28-stallion-daily-use-personal-stable.md. Anything this key signed before this entry (the owner's 2026-09-28 signing attempts on candidate 2026092700, a userdebug build) is not a Personal Stable release: it is never published and never installed on the relocked device.
The stallion key never signs an Alpha or development build. Before opening the vault, every stallion ceremony confirms swapon --show lists no disk-backed device; if the ceremony runs out of memory, the fix is more signing-host RAM, never disk swap. The expected post-relock state is ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=yellow (custom root of trust) with ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state=locked, not green. The owner turns OEM unlocking off after the relock.
4Review when
A second device or person; the update server gaining any listing, discovery, or a second enrolled device; the stallion key used for anything other than stallion Personal Stable; suspected key compromise.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-111.