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Correct two claims in ADR-026: the new key is not yet an enforced root of trust, and its "zero crash entries" evidence used a command that would report zero regardless…

Accepted, recorded 3 August 2026.

Decision
ADR-027
Date
2026-08-03
Status
AcceptedAccepted
Mentions
ADR-026
Mentioned by
ADR-030

1Decision

Correct two claims in ADR-026: the new key is not yet an enforced root of trust, and its "zero crash entries" evidence used a command that would report zero regardless of actual device state.

2Why and evidence

A same-day final review of ADR-026 found both issues before any further work built on the entry.

(1) ADR-026's rationale opens "providing no real authenticity guarantee" for the old test key, implying the new key now supplies one — it does not yet: the device remains ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state=unlocked / ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=orange (both already recorded in ADR-026, just not connected to this implication), and no avb_custom_key has been enrolled via fastboot flash avb_custom_key.

The bootloader does not enforce this signature as a root of trust; a clean boot demonstrates the image is well-formed and self-consistent, not that the device verified it against the AegisOS key. Enforcement is docs/devices/support-policy.md bring-up step 6 / validation-matrix item LYNX-001, not yet reached. (2) ADR-026 cited adb shell dumpsys dropbox --print \| grep -c "^Dropbox" returning 0 as evidence of a clean boot.

Re-run and inspected directly: dropbox entries are headed Drop box contents: N entries and individual records start with a timestamp (e.g. 2026-08-01 20:56:35 system_server_strictmode ...), never a line starting with the literal string Dropbox — the grep pattern cannot match real output regardless of device health, so the "0" was not evidence of anything.

Corrected check: grep -c "^====" (316 total entries) cross-referenced against each entry's tag, matching docs/devices/support-policy.md's existing established pattern for this device.

3Consequences

The underlying claims survive correction with real evidence: post-flash boot is genuinely clean — of 316 dropbox entries, 181 are system_app_strictmode, 131 system_server_strictmode, 2 storage_trim, and zero match crash/anr/tombstone (case-insensitive) — the same benign categories support-policy.md already established as expected for this device, this time with a real denominator.

What ADR-026 actually achieved stands: AegisOS now owns and controls a real signing key, and the sign→verify→transfer→flash→boot pipeline is proven end-to-end — a genuine and necessary prerequisite for enforced verified boot, just not enforcement itself. ADR-026's text is left as originally committed (append-only, per this log's own convention) rather than edited in place; read it together with this entry.

4Review when

Bootloader relock and avb_custom_key enrollment (support-policy step 6 / LYNX-001) is proposed or completed — at that point the "root of trust" claim becomes actually true and should be recorded as its own decision, not retrofitted onto ADR-026.

Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-027.