- Decision
- ADR-026
- Date
- 2026-08-03
- Status
- AcceptedAccepted
- Mentions
- ADR-018, ADR-021, ADR-025
- Mentioned by
- ADR-027, ADR-028, ADR-029, ADR-030
1Decision
Generate and use the first real AegisOS-owned signing key (development channel only) to re-sign the already boot-confirmed lynx-cur-userdebug build's vbmeta.img, replacing AOSP's public test key.
2Why and evidence
The device previously booted only under AOSP's universally-known test key, providing no real authenticity guarantee. docs/release/supply-chain-and-signing.md already defines the development channel as needing only limited engineering access with free replacement after exposure — no ceremony required at this level.
Per the approved design (docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-01-aegisos-development-signing-design.md), only vbmeta.img was re-signed (not a full rebuild); individual partition images are unchanged. RSA 4096 development key generated on the build server at <build-root>/keys/development/ (private key never left the server).
vbmeta-dev-signed.img produced with avbtool make_vbmeta_image using --include_descriptors_from_image per partition (this build has no chain partitions, corrected from the original design's assumption — see Task 1's findings), verified with avbtool verify_image both on the server (Task 4) and independently after transfer to the local machine (Task 5): 13/13 checks passed each time (1 top-level vbmeta struct + 12 partition Hash/Hashtree descriptors, all reporting "Successfully verified"); the resulting public-key fingerprint 7cf180b00535d72a70396995ab68b580aae05648 matched exactly between the server and local runs, and a full descriptor diff against the original vbmeta.img showed all 25 Prop entries and all 12 Hash/Hashtree descriptors identical, Rollback Index unchanged at 1783209600 — only the signing public key differed, as expected.
Flashed via fastboot flash vbmeta vbmeta-dev-signed.img (not a full flashall). Post-flash adb evidence: fingerprint google/lynx/lynx:17/CP2A.260705.006/2026073100:userdebug/test-keys, sys.boot_completed=1, ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=orange, ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state=unlocked (unchanged), zero Dropbox crash/ANR entries (clean boot).
Per the design's own explicit deferral, independent reproducibility of this signing event was not attempted (same "waived, not done" posture as ADR-018, a separate instance of that gap, not inherited from it).
Execution surfaced and fixed four real issues along the way, documented here per this log's established practice (ADR-021 through ADR-025) of recording the actual investigative path rather than only the clean end state: (1) Task 1 found the target vbmeta.img has zero chain-partition descriptors — all 12 partitions are embedded via --include_descriptors_from_image, correcting the design's original chain_partition assumption; (2) Task 3's first re-signing attempt, run with Task 1's original 25 --prop flags plus the 12 descriptors, produced a defective 50-prop, 10240-byte vbmeta, because --include_descriptors_from_image already imports each partition's own embedded Props from its AVB footer — fixed by dropping --prop entirely and adding --padding_size 65536 to match the original's fixed 65536-byte size, verified content-identical to the original afterward; (3) Task 4 found two avbtool tooling bugs, neither a defect in the signed image itself: verify_image --key only accepts PEM format, not the AVB binary pubkey struct, so using dev_key.avbpubkey misrouted to an unsupported "ML-DSA" code path — fixed by verifying with dev_key.pem instead — and avbtool resolves partition images via dirname(--image) rather than the shell's working directory, fixed with a throwaway temporary symlink directory; (4) Task 6's first flash attempt used fastboot flash --apply-vbmeta vbmeta, misread from fastboot-info.txt's internal flashall scripting syntax as a literal CLI flag, and failed immediately with unrecognized option '--apply-vbmeta' and zero bytes written (harmless) — fastboot --help confirmed the real syntax is plain flash PARTITION [FILENAME], and the corrected fastboot flash vbmeta vbmeta-dev-signed.img succeeded with OKAY.
3Consequences
This development key now signs the reference build; any future re-signing or key rotation must reference this entry. Scope remains explicitly limited — no OTA, no aegisos-release, no alpha/beta/stable key, per the design's exclusions.
4Review when
Before any alpha-channel key is proposed, before this development key is ever exposed/rotated, or if reproducibility of this specific signing event is later requested.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-026.