- Decision
- ADR-120
- Date
- 2026-10-01
- Status
- AcceptedAccepted (uncompiled)
- Part
- AirPods
1Decision
Reach AIR-029..AIR-032 and AIR-036 through three userdebug-only priv-apps (AirPodsDebugHarness, AirPodsProbeNoPerm, AirPodsProbeBtPriv) built from one source file, installed through PRODUCT_PACKAGES_DEBUG, and not through a debug component in AirPodsApp. Callable by uid shell/root only (Binder.getCallingUid() in call() plus provider permission DUMP).
2Why and evidence
MANAGE_AIRPODS_IDENTITY is signature\|privileged, so only a priv-app can make the positive calls, and the negative calls need apps without it. A debug entry inside AirPodsApp would ship a privileged IPC endpoint in every build; a separate debug-tagged package is absent from user images by construction (build/make/core/main.mk:135-139, :999) and by a gate check.
3Consequences
Adds a second and third privileged package in userdebug (one holds MANAGE_AIRPODS_IDENTITY, one BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED); check-required-packages.sh fails a user image containing any of them or the allow-list; needs a vendor/adevtool patch (0002) and a new lynx version pin.
The three apps carry the same single-package hidden-API exemption as AirPodsApp (a sysconfig file, also forbidden in user images), so the probes differ from the holder only by permission. Not proven: compilation, whether @SystemApi members are blocked at runtime for a non-exempt system app (moot for these apps; the harness reports the exception class so a wrong result cannot pass as a pass), and AIR-029/AIR-030 SDP captures (no capture rig).
4Review when
The first device run showing a non-SecurityException error from a probe; any request to add a command beyond the two setters; any user build that contains a harness file.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-120.