1Decision
Resolve the remaining-leaks audit's three low-confidence items (14, 16, 17) via independent source tracing, and fix a real leak found while doing so that the audit had mischaracterized.
2Why and evidence
Item 14 (SupervisionService.hasNonTestDefaultUsers()): no-fix, confirmed unreachable — its only Binder entry point requires MANAGE_ROLE_HOLDERS (signature\|installer\|module, unobtainable by any app running in a decoy session), its only real caller is OS-internal (RoleControllerService, itself gated a second time behind a shell-only BYPASS_ROLE_QUALIFICATION flag), and git log --grep=^aegisos on SupervisionService.java returns zero commits — this is unmodified upstream Google CTS-qualification code, not something the decoy feature touched or worsened.
Item 17 (KeyguardSecurityContainer.findLargeUserIcon): no-fix — its caller chain (UserSwitcherController → UserSwitcherInteractor → UserRepository → UserTracker) is seeded from ActivityManager.getCurrentUser() and kept live via IActivityManager.registerUserSwitchObserver, i.e. device-current-user-scoped, the opposite of ADR-066's Binder-calling-user failure pattern; additionally dead code on lynx specifically (config_enableBouncerUserSwitcher=false, no lynx overlay changes that default).
Item 16 split in two, correcting the audit's own premise: AppInfoDashboardFragment.java:607/726 really is moot, gated behind its own !mUserManager.isAdminUser() check, and the decoy is confirmed non-admin (no FLAG_ADMIN in UserTypeFactory.getDefaultTypeFullAegisosDecoy(), and no pm create-user path can add it) — but AppButtonsPreferenceController.java, the audit's other citation for the same item, has no admin gate anywhere in the file; the audit had conflated the two files' protection.
Fixed at the shared root instead of the one cited call site: Utils.isProfileOrDeviceOwner(UserManager, DevicePolicyManager, String) (packages/apps/Settings) now uses getUsersForUiDisplay(true) instead of raw getUsers(), closing not just AppButtonsPreferenceController but three more real call sites (AppButtonRepository.kt, AppDisableButton.kt, AppInfoSettingsMoreOptions.kt, all Compose "SPA" App Info screens) that the original 21-item audit missed entirely.
isDeviceOwnerAppOnAnyUser(), the other cross-user check in the same method, is deliberately left unscoped — a genuine device-wide security control (block uninstalling a device owner regardless of which user asks), not a per-user display concern.
Authored under the established local-first worktree discipline (fetched file confirmed byte-identical via sha256sum before editing, landed via git am after confirming no build was in flight, patch regenerated fresh from the real post-git am branch history) and build-verified (m Settings: Build Succeeded: 20 steps, 5m49s, only pre-existing unrelated warnings).
3Consequences
Patch exported to aegisos-platform/credential/duress-unlock-decoy/patches/packages-apps-settings/0007, SOURCE.md updated. Eleven of the (now 22, after this entry's own find) audit items are fixed. Build-verified only as of this entry — dynamic re-validation deferred to the same consolidated hardware round as the other ten.
4Review when
Items 9-11 and 15 (Medium/narrow severity, e.g. the current-user-display-name gate, VPN summary text, and the migration-size estimate) remain deliberately out of this round's scope, per the audit's own recommended-priority section — revisit only if the owner asks to close them too, not implicitly.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-071.