- Decision
- ADR-065
- Date
- 2026-08-30
- Status
- AcceptedAccepted
- Part
- Duress Unlock
- Mentioned by
- ADR-066, ADR-067, ADR-073, ADR-074
1Decision
Following the owner's request to close every remaining Duress Unlock open item, exempt the decoy user from the Wallet QS tile's main-user-only gate (QuickAccessWalletTile.java:209), so the tile appears for a decoy session the same as it would for the real owner. Leave the Mobile-Data/Internet tile alone.
2Why and evidence
Task 8 of the third plan had explicitly left the Wallet/Mobile-Data tile inconsistency as an out-of-scope product decision, not a security fix (the underlying state, RoleManager role holders and QuickAccessWalletClient, is already per-caller — no identity ever leaks through it). Asked directly, the owner chose to close it for Wallet, going beyond the threat model's strict requirement toward a more thoroughly indistinguishable decoy session.
A fresh source read against the real branch found the plan's premise half wrong before acting on it: CellularTile.java no longer exists in this tree (merged into InternetTileNewImpl.kt), and no USER_SYSTEM/main-user gate exists anywhere in the current Internet/Mobile-Data tile implementation — any future per-user difference there would come from SubscriptionManager/SIM-visibility logic, not a tile-level check, so there is nothing to fix at the tile level today.
The owner accepted this correction and scoped the change to Wallet only.
The fix reuses UserManager#getUsersForUiDisplay, the same identity-aware primitive every Component B fix in this plan already uses (confirmed via UserManagerService's real implementation: when the caller is the decoy, it returns a singleton list containing only the caller's own UserInfo) rather than introducing a new, previously-unused @hide/@UnsupportedAppUsage API call whose resolution from SystemUI's build target was unconfirmed.
Authored under the local-first patch discipline (disposable worktree aegisos-platform/.worktrees/duress-wallet-tile-fix/, fetched file confirmed byte-identical via sha256sum before editing, landed via git am on the real aegisos-duress-decoy-switch branch, real post-am SHA 6740d16784cbcb7fbb9490523276e178e6aeb653), and confirmed by a fast, detached m SystemUI build check (Build Succeeded: 773 steps, SystemUI.apk freshly rebuilt) with no compile diagnostics attached to the edited file.
3Consequences
frameworks/base patch 0025 exported to aegisos-platform/credential/duress-unlock-decoy/patches/frameworks-base/, SOURCE.md updated.
This is compile-time verification only — it does not confirm the tile actually renders correctly for a real decoy session; that is deferred to the feature's still-open UI verification sweep (lock-screen avatar switcher, com.android.multiuser widget, clipboard overlay, alarm icon, Material You theming, and now this tile), none of which has run against this specific patch yet.
Separately, the same investigation resolved a different open item without any code change: com.android.multiuser's two signature\|privileged permissions (MANAGE_USERS, INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS) are genuinely granted for the real lynx target via the OEM-derived, build-wired vendor/google_devices/lynx/sysconfig/system_ext/permissions/privapp-permissions-google-se.xml — the prior audit's "no allowlist entry" finding was accurate only against the generic cross-device privapp-permissions-platform.xml, never the right file to check for this system_ext-specific app; no defect exists here.
4Review when
The UI verification sweep (this tile plus the other UNCHECKED surfaces) is the next item in the owner's prioritized closure order, followed by a call/media notification dynamic-trigger test, a post-wipe reboot characterization (blocked on a spare device), a timing side-channel constant-time implementation, and — last, deliberately, given its risk — a Component A redesign.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-065.