- Decision
- ADR-139
- Date
- 2026-10-05
- Status
- ProposedProposed
- Part
- AirPods
- Mentioned by
- ADR-140
1Decision
The AirPods app gets android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT by default, through default-permissions-org.sovereignos.airpods.xml in /system/etc/default-permissions (fixed="false", so the owner can still revoke it), and does nothing in any user other than the system user: ConnectionReceiver, AirPodsRuntime.start and the config provider return at once when Process.myUserHandle().isSystem is false.
2Why and evidence
Owner decision 2026-10-05: the app is a component of Settings' device page and has no screen that asks for the permission, so it must already have it. DefaultPermissionGrantPolicy reads exceptions only for a system package of a target SDK above 22, and PackageManagerService runs the default grants for every user at first start and whenever the build fingerprint changes [verified-in-source: frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/permission/DefaultPermissionGrantPolicy.java, PackageManagerService.java]. The grant therefore reaches the Duress decoy user too.
3Consequences
Supersedes the owner decision pending in status.md about the default BLUETOOTH_CONNECT grant for production builds. No new permission: the app already requested it. The system-user guard keeps the app inert in the decoy user, as it was while the permission had to be granted by hand; the guard is not yet tested with a decoy user on a device. The build gate requires the XML (tools/build/check-required-packages.sh). Proven by AIR-196 (granted by default on lynx, a second user not yet run).
4Review when
A second user that needs the AirPods; a platform change to the default grants; a decoy design in which the owner is not the system user.
Read from docs/governance/decision-log.md, entry ADR-139.